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Abstract: 
The democratic deficit in the so-called bargaining democracy provides the 
motivation for constitutional efforts to limit the ability of different groups to form 
coalitions that are able to grant benefits to themselves through legislation that more 
or less directly benefit identifiable groups. A constitutional hierachy of laws that 
stand in conflict is proposed. In this hierarchy more “rule-oriented” legislation 
dominate less “rule-oriented” legislation. The main purpose of the proposal is to 
create a momentum of the political process towards more rule-oriented policy 
actions and legislation, and to inspire the policy debate to focus on principles and 
rules to an increasing extent. At the same time, the difficulty of defining a rule as 
opposed to an outcome-oriented directive is avoided by limiting the task of a 
constitutional court to simply rank conflicting policy actions with respect to the 
degree actions satisfy criteria for rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     "Democracy is in danger when voters can vote money to themselves” 
                                            (Alexis de Toqueville, 1835-40) 
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           1. Introduction 
“The state is a two-edged sword: The existence of a state is essential for economic 
growih; the state, however, is the source of man-made decline.” (North, 1981, p, 
20) 
The concept of the “bargaining democracy” was coined by Hayek (1973) to 
describe the current political systems in the western democracies. He challenges the 
notion that current democratic governments deliver results that can be said to 
represent the majority's will. The essence of the argument is that the ability to form 
majorities for political decisions with respect to specific social objectives favored by 
specific groups leads to a “bargaining democracy” in which the outcome of the 
political process cannot be said to represent the majority’s preferred outcome.  
       The political debate on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean reflects criticism of the 
democratic process which to some extent accords with Hayek’s view of the 
bargaining democracy. In the United States campaign finance reform is viewed by 
many as a way of reducing the influence of particularly well organized and well 
funded lobby groups on the political process. In parliamentary democracies like 
Sweden economists and political scientists alike have argued that the result of the 
democratic process is more representative of the will of a few strong interest groups 
than of  “the will of the people”.1 In both cases the democratic deficit is viewed as a 
result of the capture of the political process by particularly well funded and well 
organized groups.  
      The criticism of the democratic political process implied by concept of the 
bargaining democracy is more far-reaching. It is based on the ability of groups to 
form coalitions which can and inevitably will grant benefits to the members of the 
coalition at the expense of non-members.2 Thus, the criticism would stand even if 
all individuas had the same ability and means to become members of the majority in 
power. It is the ability of the government to grant benefits to individuals and groups 
that inevitably will be the cause of a dynamic political process wherein many 
majority decisions are made although the decisions in themselves do not have the 
support of the majority. 
          In recent years Buchanan (e.g. 1993) and Hayek have argued that majority 
rule can be made to reflect the “will of the people”--in Hayek’s words--only if 
majority political decisions are limited to “rules of just conduct” applicable to all 
citizens as opposed to political decisions aimed at specific social objectives favored 
by identifiable groups.3 Both Buchanan and Hayek have proposed constitutional 
solutions to reduce the democratic deficit of the bargaining democracy. Their 
constitutional proposals are based on constraints being made on the type of 
decisions legislatures make by means of majority votes. 
          In this paper an alternative constitutional proposal for resolving or reducing 
the bargaining democracy problem is put forward. Under the proposal there are no 
constraints on the type of decisions subject to majority vote in the legislature. 
Instead a hierarchy of legislative decisions is proposed. More “rule-oriented” 
decisions dominate less “rule-oriented” decisions.4 A constitutional definition of 
                                                 
1 The Lindbeck Commission (1996) emphasizes the link between the influence of strong interest groups and the 
relative economic decline of Sweden. The Swedish Bureau of Economic and Social Research (SNS) publishes 
annual reports by political scientists focusing on current issues with respect to “the state of democracy”. See, for 
example, SNS Demokratiråd (1995, 1996, 1997) 
      2 Favors and benefits for particular groups need not enrich these groups but may support causes favored by the groups. 
3 In three volumes of Law, Legiskation and Liberty Hayek (1973, 1976 and 1979) analyzes and expands on 
principles for a democratic society with a minimum of coercion of individuals by other individuals and by the state. 
4 A distinction is sometimes made between principles as general formulations of objectives while rules specify actions under very 
specific circumstances. For example, US accounting standards are called rule-oriented while many European countries have 
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greater degree of “rule-orientation” of political decisions is required. A 
constitutional court is charged with the responsibility of resolving inconsistencies 
between laws in accordance with the principle of the hierarchy. The hierarchy is 
intended to create political dynamics with increased emphasis on decisions with 
respect to rules, while bargaining for benefits to identifiable groups would be 
discouraged.  
       The causes of the democratic deficit in the bargaining democracy are discussed 
in Section 2. The possible contradiction between preferences for “rules of just 
conduct” and preferences for specific policy objectives with respect to identifiable 
groups is explained. In order to claim that there is a democratic deficit a benchmark 
is required. A political equilibrium will be defined to provide such a benchmark.  
      The constitutional proposal is presented in Section 3, while the concept of rule-
orientation of legislative decisions is discussed at greater length in Section 4. Hayek 
(1973) devotes several chapters to define the meaning of a ”rule of just conduct” 
and the differences in political dynamics that result from decisions with respect to 
such rules and decisions with respect to specific objectives and groups in society. 
Few political decisions made in legislative assemblies are purely in one category or 
the other, but most legislation has elements of rules while it to some extent is 
designed to achieve objectives favored by particular groups. 
     The growing economic literature on political processes is reviewed in Section 5. 
Most of this modern economic analyses of political processes rely on assumptions 
about asymmetry of information between citizens and their representatives, or about 
transactions costs. It will be argued that the constitutional proposal resolves many of 
the deficiences of the political process identified in the economic literature.  
       Existing constitutional proposals designed to reduce or resolve the problems of 
the bargaining democracy are discussed in Section 6 and compared to the proposal 
presented here. It is argued that existing proposals are difficult to implement 
because they require that a distinction is made between rules and political decisions 
aimed at specific outcomes for identifiable groups. The dynamics towards increased 
rule orientation of political decisions require only that legislation can be compared 
in terms of rule-orientation. Final reflections and summary follow in Section 7. 
 
           
             2. The democratic deficit of the bargaining democracy 
[A situation wherein a] "majority governmeni does not produce what the majority 
wants but what each of the groups making up the majority must concede to the 
others to get their support for what it wants itself amounts to… [corruption "] 
(Hayek, 19 79, p. 11) 
 In three volumes, Hayek (1973, 1976, 1979) analyzes and challenges the notion 
that current democratic governments deliver results that can be said to represent the 
majority's will. Another quote from Hayek (1979, p 99) illustrates his argument with 
respect to the cause of the democratic deficit: “The cause of complaints is not that 
the governments serve an agreed opinion of the majority, but that they are bound to 
serve the several interests of a conglomerate of numerous groups". It is the demands 
of a multitude of special interests "each of which will consent to the special benefits 
granted to other groups only at the price of their own special interests being equally 
considered". These statements apply on parliamentary democracies, as well as on 
systems with more explicit checks and balances between the executive and the 
legislative branches of governments, as in the USA. Furthermore, democracies with 
proportional voting systems and strong political parties, as well as those with 
majority voting systems and a stronger link between voters and the elected 
representative are subject to the critique. One has only to read David Stockman's 
(1983) account of his negotiations as Budget Director in the early years of the 
Reagan administration, and Kjell Olof Feldt's (1991) review of his years as Finance 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
principle- oriented accounting standards. This terminology is possibly mis-leading and will not be used here. Instead rules and 
principles are nearly synonymous. The concepts are crucial in the argumantation and will be discussed in more detail below.    
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Minister in the Swedish Social-democrat government 1982-1990 to obtain vivid 
illustrations of the meaning of the "bargaining democracy" in two different types of 
democratic government.5 While the bargaining to create majorities occurs among 
individual representatives in the U.S., most of the bargaining in parliamentary 
systems occurs within the political party or parties holding a majority in parliament. 
Differences between the systems will be discussed briefly below. 
                    The root cause of the democratic problem in modern democracies in Hayek's 
analysis is the omnipotence of democratically elected governments. Classically 
liberal principles of separation of powers, the rule of the sovereignty of law, 
government under the law, the distinction between public and private law, and rules 
of judicial procedure serve to limit the coercive powers of governments. The 
principles are still expressed in most democratic constitutions, but they have been 
eroded and increasingly put aside in the belief that democratic control in the form of 
competition among, for example, different parties make any other safeguards 
against government coercion unnecessary.  
                    The competition for political power in democracies has been compared to 
competition among firms in a product market, where the relevant information for 
consumers to make informed decisions is made available through the competitive 
process. Becker (1985), for example, provides an analysis of the competitive 
political process and derives propositions with respect to the economic efficiency of 
the process. Thereby, he seems to contradict Hayek’s criticism of the bargaining 
democracy. Efficiency in a welfare economic sense is obtained if the political 
process is truly revealing to voters about the results of various tax-subsidy schemes, 
and about the deadweight cost associated with the schemes. Wittman (1995) argues 
in a similar vein that the argument for the “failure of democracy” is based on the 
myth that voters do not have the ability to understand the political process and 
consequences for themselves of different policy measures. 
  Another strand of economic literature that seems to contradict the criticism 
of the bargaining democracy refers to log-rolling--the ability of groups or their 
representatives to bargain among each other for mutual support--as an efficiency 
enhancing device. Tullock (1969) shows that log-rolling potentially improves the 
efficiency of the political process relative to a situation when various governmental 
initiatives would have to be approved one by one by majority voting. Log-rolling 
enables strength of preferences to influence the allocation of resources under 
government control. Aggregate wealth increasing actions that would not occur with 
simple majority voting are made feasible with log-rolling.  
An important assumption behind the argument for potential wealth increasing 
effects of log-rolling is that the range of legislative activity is given. Specifically, 
the legislature decides on the allocation of collective goods and policies aimed at 
correcting possible market failures. In modern democracies, however, governments 
are involved in a much broader range of issues, some of which are purely 
redistributive and some of which are in the government domain only because 
various groups have been able to make a case for government involvement. In other 
words, the existence of collective goods and market failures are not generally the 
reason for government involvement. It is sufficient that a group or a coalition of 
groups can gather sufficient political strength for the government to influence 
economic activities such that the groups are favored. The support of agriculture and 
the particular channels of this support, as well as the support of specific industries, 
                                                 
5 Kjell-Olof Feldt tells, for example, the story about discussions when developing the goverment's 
budget for 1990. Discussions were held with two power centers -- the trade union leadership, and the 
socialdemocrat party's parliamentary group. The finance minister proposed delaying improved parental 
insurance and delaying a proposed sixth vacation week. In the parliamentary group one half of the rnembers 
supported the parental insurance and the other half defended vacations. The trade unions could support delaying 
both refoms if certain tax changes were implemented. The result was that the finance minister could not delay 
any of the two reforms, each strongly supported by half the governing party's representatives (Pp. 447-450). 
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are examples of government policies affecting both the allocation of resources and 
the distribution of wealth without evident market failures. 
The literature on log-rolling and Becker's (1985) analysis of the efficiency of 
the political process do not explicitly address the issue whether the outcome of the 
political process is preferred to the outcome, had the scope of government activities 
been different. The main point of Hayek's critique, on the other hand, is as noted 
that the scope of government activities becomes wider than what a majority would 
want, because the omnipotence of governments leads to the formation of coalitions 
seeking to get the government involved in activities that favor them one way or 
another.  
The omnipotence of democratically elected governments has caused a shift in 
the role of the legislative assembly as the creator of "law". To the constitutionalists 
laws were traditionally meant to prevent "unjust conduct". They should be equally 
applicable to all individuals in an unknown number of future instances. Such laws 
under the domain of the legislative stand in contrast to "directives", and specific 
commands or privileges referring to particular individuals and groups under the 
domain of governments. In modern democracies, the power of laying down laws in 
the above sense, and the power of issuing directives and commands have been 
placed in the same hands. The term law is used both for law in its original meaning, 
and for what could be called directives and commands favoring various groups of 
citizens. Both the executive and the legislative branches are involved in issuing 
governmental directives and commands under the name of laws but few general 
rules constrain governments in most countries. Thus, governments in democracies 
have been empowered to act both in the special and the general interest. 
 Hayek (1979), as well as Brennan and Buchanan (1985), emphasize that the 
distribution of income and welfare, resulting from the democratic process, is not 
likely to correspond to anyone's or the majority's conception of distributive justice 
nor is it the result of individuals and governments behaving in accordance with 
generally agreed upon rules of conduct. 
The lack of correspondence between the outcome of the democratic process 
and a general conception of what would be the outcome under some acceptable 
rules of conduct affect individuals' behavior in both the political and the economic 
arenas. In the political arena there is a necessity for different groups to watch the 
process and lobby for benefits in order to obtain a favorable "bargain". If they do 
not, they nevertheless end up paying for benefits to others. In the economic arena 
individuals are induced to behave such that they benefit from the structure of 
benefits and privileges handed out by the govenment creating deadweight costs and 
inducing them to violate the rules of conduct they would have subscribed to had 
others been expected to follow the same rules.  
The implication of Hayek's argument is that in a comparison of the majority 
supported outcome in the "bargaining democracy", and the outcome under majority 
supported rules of conduct, the majority is likely to prefer the latter, and the 
dynamics of the "bargaining democracy" discussed above make it increasingly 
inferior as time goes by. In the language of modern economics there are multiple, 
political, majority supported outcomes corresponding to different sets of rules of 
conduct among governments, individuals, and firms. To the extent political 
decisions are not consistent with citizens’ perception of what is fair, the government 
must apply coercion to implement the decisions. Hayek’s criterium for a well 
functioning democracy is that the degree of coercion applied by the government 
should be minimized. 
The democratic problem can be interpreted as the ability of the political 
process to generate a majority supported outcome with respect to benefits and costs 
for individuals and groups which is consistent with their behavior under majority 
supported rules of conduct. A democratic or political equilibrium could be thought 
of as the situation when the result of the political process is consistent with the 
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result of individual and governmental activities constrained only by general rules of 
just conduct.  
A comparison can be made between the democratic equilibrium described 
above and the economic market equilibrium condition stating that ex post outcomes 
are consistent with ex ante expectations. In the political process individuals vote ex 
ante on rules of conduct in their interaction. Ex post, the majority determines which 
specific groups’ objectives will be supported. In the democratic equilibrium the ex 
post voting on benefits to various groups is consistent with the behavior of 
individuals under the ex ante rules of conduct. This consistency may be seen as a 
benchmark for evaluating the quality of the political process. In the bargaining 
democracy there are stong incentives for a majority to use its power to achieve 
objectives that are inconsistent with ex ante determined rules of conduct. Also, 
individuals’ behavior under different rules of conduct will be influenced by the 
knowledge that a majority will favor particular groups ex post. Thus, there is an 
argument for constraining the power of the majority to grant benefits and favors to 
various groups.   
Would it not be possible or even likely that a political party would arise in the 
"bargaining democracy" proposing that benefits and privileges to particular groups 
should be slashed across the board, and that legislation on general principles and 
rules of conduct should be given priority politically, if a majority actually supports 
such a program? Such a party may appear, but its days in power are likely to be 
short without constitutional change. A "political equilibrium" with agreement on 
principles and rules of conduct would be unstable, because as long as groups or their 
representatives have the power to bargain for special benefits, there is an incentive 
to do so. Groups which do not want to participate in the bargaining for potential 
benefits risk losing out unless all groups agree not to participate. Great certainty 
about enforcement of the principle that groups should not use the political process to 
favor their own objectives now and in the future would be required for all groups to 
abide by the principle.   
 
3. A  constitutional proposal for a hierarchy of laws. 
               “…today legislatures are no longer so called because they 
             make the laws, but laws are so called because they emanate from legislatures" (Hayek,   
            1979, page 4) 
The constitutional proposal that follows is offered as a basis for further analysis and 
discussion. Its effectiveness will not be proven but it will be argued that its 
implementation will lead to a dynamic political process wherein legislative 
assemblies will focus on rules of conduct and be discouraged from taking political 
decisions granting benefits to specific groups in society unless these benefits are 
consistent with legislated rules of conduct.  
      The proposal is the following: Establish a general constitutional principle for a 
hierarchy of legislative action such that legislation with stronger rule-orientation 
will dominate and overrule conflicting legislation and directives with weaker rule 
orientation. Degree of rule-orientation is defined by the extent to which legislation 
satifies criteria for rules of conduct. A constitutional court with political 
independence would be charged with the task of comparing the rule orientation of 
conflicting legislation. The constitution would include criteria for comparing rule-
orientation of political decisions. These criteria will be discussed below. They refer 
in particular to “directedness” of legislation with respect to identifiable groups, and 
“arbitrariness” in judging when legislation applies. One advantage relative to other 
constitutional proposals discussed in Section 6 is that the constitutional court need 
not determine the dividing line between rules of conduct and legislation with 
specific social objectives favored by groups in society. Instead the constitutional 
court would be charged with the task of comparing conflicting laws and directives, 
and judging their relative degrees of satisfaction of criteria for rules. It will be 
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argued that such a relative evaluation of legislation is much easier than determining 
whether a legislative decision is a rule or not. 
Under this proposal there is no constraint on the type of decisions 
governments make. Groups or their representatives would be able to bargain for 
government resources but if another majority would vote for a conflicting law with 
greater rule-orientation, then the bargain could not be implemented. Assume, for 
example, that there are three sub-groups in the assembly representing three groups 
with different interests in society. Two of them negotiate an agreement whereby 
group One is supported by group Two in a vote on transfers to group One, while 
group Two receives benefits from protection against competition through support of 
group One. If group Three opposing both measures could get group One to agree on 
a general rule prohibiting certain types of protection against competition, then the 
favors given to group Two would cease at no cost to group one. 
The hierarchy would make it risky for groups to enter bargains, because 
the group that loses a favorable policy action in the constitutional court would still 
be settled with the costs associated with favors to other groups in the original 
bargain. In the example above the group losing protection would still be settled with 
costs for transfers to other groups in the original coalition. Thus, there would be 
incentives to design policy measures in a general enough way for the measures to 
gain majority support on their own merits although there would be no constitutional 
restrictions on the ability to form bargaining coalitions.  
Apart from facing risk stemming from a group losing the benefits of a 
favorable political decision, each group would hesitate to enter a coalition with a 
group that is seeking highly directed benefits. The reason is that once the coalition 
has unravelled, any group in it may only have minority support and risk losing its 
benefits. Thus, the hierarchy would create a political system with a momentum 
towards rule-oriented legislation. At the same time the system would not rule out 
policy measures for dealing with market failures. Log-rolling coalitions for truly 
collective goods or for dealing with externalities should remain stable because 
general criteria for supplying such services are more easily defined than for policy 
measures with more directed content. Redistributive policy measures would have to 
be formulated with transparency primarily as changes in general tax schedules, 
while redistribution through many small measures without transparency would be 
discouraged. 
An important assumption for the practicality of the hierarchy proposal is 
that there are few dimensions of the criteria for the ranking of policy measures in 
terms of rule-orientation. If the ranking depends on three or more criteria, then it is 
possible that the ranking becomes arbitrary and lose legitimacy. We turn now to a 
discussion of the meaning and role of rules in order to motivate that lack of 
directedness and lack of arbitrariness are used as criteria for determining rule-
orientation. 
           
             4. Politics of Rules and Outcomes 
            "The crucial point is that votes on rules applicable to all, and votes on 
measures which directly affect only some, have a wholly different character" 
(Hayek, 1979, p 8) 
 
Constitutional rules define the "social contract" among citizens. An important aspect 
of this contract is the division of power among the judiciary and the branches of 
government. Thereby, the public vs. the private spheres of decision-making are 
determined. What kind of decisions are made by individuals and under what rules of 
conduct? Which types of decisions are made by the legislative branch, the executive 
branch, and the public administration and under what rules of conduct? By what 
means are various rules of conduct enforced? The constitutional contract is decided 
upon under, at least, a partial "veil of ignorance" about future circumstances of the 
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individuals, and it determines the scope and the tools of the government's coercion 
of individuals, and indirectly the scope for individuals' coercion of each other. 
The key feature of rules of just conduct emphasized by Hayek is lack of 
specific social objective favored by identifiable groups in society. Rules apply in an 
unknown number of future circumstances to individuals who cannot be identified 
when the rule is set. Thus, they apply the same way independent of the affected 
individuals' characteristics in terms of income, job, age, etc. Ideally rules would be 
determined under a “veil of ignorance" creating the likelihood that they will apply 
equally across individuals. Thus, rules can be said to have little "directedness" in 
terms of social outcomes favored by particular groups. 
Generality is often viewed as a characteristic of rules (e.g. Buchanan, 
1993). The term generality leaves room for ambiguity when defining a rule, 
however. A "law" stating that each individual should, be provided social insurance 
according to the person's needs may seem to have generality but this "law,' is highly 
outcome oriented, or specific with respect to social objective and social groups. 
Such a law is therefore “directed” and not a rule of conduct. If a high degree of 
generality would be the criterion for rules of conduct, the rules would leave room 
for arbitrariness in the implementation; especially if the right of interpretation is 
given to by public administrators rather than to courts. A rule of conduct should 
have predictability with respect to the conditions under which it applies. At the 
same time, particular results of the rule are largely unpredictable. The social 
insurance rule above fails in this respect. Thus, a policy decision is increasingly a 
rule, the less the action is directed towards specific objectives favored by 
identifiable individuals at the time the decision is made, and the more the decision 
specifies predictable consequences of specific conduct. The first aspect can be seen 
as a "degree of cover of veil of ignorance" or "degree of lack of directedness", while 
the second aspect can be viewed as a "lack of arbitrariness" condition for the 
implementation of a rule. In combination the two aspects of a rule of conduct lead to 
a minimum degree of required coercion by the government. The lack of directedness 
implies that the rule is likely to reflect a majority's sense of moral and fair conduct. 
The second aspect implies that individuals are able to arrange their activities such 
that a violation of the rule does not occur. Coercion by the state is required 
primarily to enforce rules rather than enforcing various measures required to 
achieve outcomes that cannot be achieved without violation of what most people 
consider fair conduct. 
The veil of ignorance aspect is obviously nearly impossible to achieve 
perfectly. Similarly, lack of arbitrariness cannot be achieved because all future 
circumstances cannot be known -- contracts are incomplete in the terminology of 
modern economics. Thus, if a constitutional court would evaluate whether a policy 
decision qualifies as a rule, some guidance with respect to the borderline between 
rules and non-rules is necessary. Dixit (1996) expresses some scepticism about the 
possibility of drawing a line between decisions with respect to rules and decisions 
with respect to outcome. Few instances of policy making refer to either pure rules or 
pure directives affecting outcomes more directly. 
This discussion can be related to Dixit’s (1996) transactions cost 
framework for politics. There is little doubt that there are transactions costs 
associated with the determination of what a rule is. On the other hand, transactions 
costs in the political process of finding majority support for a rule may be relatively 
low. One reason is that rules are not suitable for bargaining about favors and the less 
directed are rules, the less is the scope for exchanging favors by mutual support for 
rules favored by different groups. A second reason is that the number of alternative 
rules under political consideration is likely to be smaller than the range of possible 
directed policy measures. For example, agreement on liability rules with respect to 
health standards may be relatively easy to reach, while opinions about exact 
standards may very. Votes on exact standards can also be used to favor particular 
producers. Fears that non-tariff trade barriers can be erected by means of health 
 9
standards are wide-spread. On the other hand, enforcement costs of liability rules 
could be higher than enforcement costs of exact standards. 
Dixit (1996) views rules as commitments to act in specific ways under 
well-defined circumstances. Since all circumstances cannot be specified, situations 
may arise when "breach of contract" is preferable to all involved. In such a case a 
strong rule commitment could inhibit flexibility. "Loop-holes" in the rule may serve 
to increase flexibility but the more loop-holes that are built into the rule to begin 
with the less credible is the commitment. In other words, loop-holes are a source of 
arbitrariness in the implementation of a rule. These considerations imply that there 
is an optimal degree of rule orientation of laws and that a constitution should not 
require the legislature to abide by a specific definition of rules. The constitutional 
proposal presented above would make it possible for the political process to seek an 
optimal degree of rule-orientation in each legal area.  
One way for the legislature to make rules without creating inflexibility is 
to make laws enabling rather than mandatory as discussed in Macey(1993) and 
Wihlborg (1997). Enabling law would dominate mandatory law in the hierarchy 
proposal. Mandatory law often has a higher degree of "directedness" than enabling 
law because mandatory law rules in many areas such as corporate-, labor-, and 
credit market law have the objective of achieving specific outcomes for identifiable 
groups. For example, labor law specifying a certain order of lay-offs, or a certain 
number of hours per work-week may represent political favors to specific groups. If 
the laws were enabling the law would simply specify a "default contract" kicking in 
if parties cannot come to an agreement about lay-off principles and work hours. 
Mandatory law then implies a greater degree of coercion and it reduces flexibility to 
adjust commitments to varying circumstances across individuals and time.  
It is obvious that governments cannot limit themselves to determine 
rules of conduct. By popular consent they must use coercive powers to raise funds 
through taxation to provide for a number of services, and they issue directives and 
commands to protect individuals' health, the environment, etc. Hayek does not argue 
that governments should abstain from the mentioned activities but that the coercive 
powers to tax and affect the distribution of wealth and the allocation of resources 
should be constrained by generally agreed upon principles for the conduct of 
government. Such principles may take the form of constitutional rules but regular 
law could also be and is used to establish principles for government's tax and 
expenditure policies. For example, a possible rule when deciding on government 
expenditures would be that individuals voting for a particular expenditure item 
should know their shares in the costs. If so, the burden of each individual for 
expenditures must be known by predetermined taxation rules when expenditure 
decisions are made. Another rule with respect to government expenditure policy, 
which has been implemented in, for example, Sweden is that the expenditure ceiling 
must be determined before expenditures are allocated to various government 
activities. Votes on such rules for policy making would have a strong rule- 
orientation and therefore invalidate political decisions that do not abide by the rule. 
 
 
 
             5. Modern Political Economy Analysis and Constitutional Proposal 
The critique of the "bargaining" democracy discussed above relies to a large extent 
on a dynamic argument about the scope of governments' activities and individuals' 
responses to the incentives provided by the political process. These arguments are 
essentially economic although methodologically Hayek is not within the mainstream 
of economists. The analysis is in many ways supported by modern economic 
analyses of the political process. A brief review of such analyses follows in this 
section and the contribution of the constitutional proposal to resolve issues in the 
literature is discussed. 
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                A negative view among economists of the political process as a substitute 
for the market process is founded in Arrow's paradox (1951) and generalizations 
thereof. If the political process is to determine the aggregate preferred alternative 
among more than two choices, then no procedure for aggregating individual 
preferences is consistent with minimal sets of normative constraints such as 
non-dictatorship (Mueller, 1997, p 7). Thus, majority rule may reflect aggregate 
preferences reasonably well when there is a simple choice between two alternatives 
but few issues resolved by the political process are of this kind. 
         One implication of these results with respect to the imperfections of the 
democratic process based on majority rule is that the dynamics of the process 
becomes very important. However, there are rarely opportunities given, nor 
information available to politically reveal preferences between the current situation 
and what would have been the situation, had the dynamic path been different. The 
political choice is generally among a set of political actions leading to outcomes 
within a narrow range in the short run. A choice among dynamic paths, however, or 
between outcomes over a longer time horizon would have to be translated into a 
choice among rules of conduct for individuals, firms, and the government. Such 
choices are rarely given by the political process but the constituional proposal 
would increase the rule orientation of the political debate and therefore enhance the 
choice among dynamic paths.  
         As noted there exists an economic literature taking a more positive view of the 
political process. Market failures provide the rationale for political intervention in 
the allocation process. Only the most hard-core market oriented economists would 
limit the role of the government to national security and law enforcement. Buchanan 
and Tullock (1962) - two authors who have been among the leading proponents of 
public choice analysis - led the way among economists to a constructive economic 
analysis of the political process emphasizing, like Hayek does, the distinction 
between analysis of rules governing the political process and analysis of specific 
measures. Buchanan (1975) in particular has emphasized the role of normative 
analysis of the rules of the political process -- the constitution.6 The constitution is a 
contract established under "a veil of ignorance" about the outcome for individuals of 
political and economic processes over the lifetime of the constitution. Buchanan's 
emphasis of normative analysis of rules as opposed to outcomes of the political 
process is motivated by the deficiencies of political processes for choice among 
outcomes. 
The public choice literature inspired to a large extent by Buchanan has 
become increasingly formalized during recent decades borrowing its tools from 
economic analysis under asymmetric information. As Mueller (1997, p. 140) puts it, 
constitutional democracy can be thought of as "a principal agent problem on a 
colossal scale". The principal-agent problem exists when two parties in an economic 
relation have different information and one party - the principal - cannot observe the 
actions of the other - the agent. If the parties have different objectives then the 
agent's "opportunistic" behavior in his or her own interest may be welfare reducing. 
There are conflicts of interest between the parties that may be partially or fully 
resolved by a contract provided there exists an enforcement mechanism. 
In most public choice analyses elected representatives are viewed as 
agents of the voters who do not possess the information of the representatives. Thus, 
the latter are able to follow their own agenda to a certain extent. This agenda may 
include a stronger emphasis on the short term than the voters or it may include 
power or wealth. In a dynamic context, elections control the opportunistic behavior 
of the representatives -moral hazard - but only imperfectly. Incentive compatibility 
between voters and politicians in this context is possible only with the politicians' 
                                                 
6 Wicksell (1896) was an early proponent of the so called contractuarian approach. He made the distinction between 
"just procedure" and "just outcomes". 
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"refusal to vote selfishly" (Ferejohn, 1994) or an enforceable commitment not to 
vote that way. Such a commitment cannot be made perfectly credible, however.  
The principal-agent framework can explain aspects of the "bargaining 
democracy" described above. Politicians' preferences may be influenced in different 
ways by specific interests, which for various reasons obtain a stronger weight in the 
preferences of some politicians than among those they represent. The politicians 
representing different interests can thereafter bargain within a political party or 
among themselves to obtain a majority for a group of interests. 
Mueller (1989) and Weingust, Sheapshle and Johnsen (1981) shed 
additional light on so called pork-barrel politics in models where the individual 
tax-payer bears a small fraction of costs, while benefits of a political action are 
concentrated. Too many socially inefficient projects gain majority support under 
these circumstances as would be expected in the bargaining democracy. 
Representatives are also imperfectly informed about individuals' 
behavior. Thus, there is a principle-agent problem with individuals being the agents 
of their representatives. In this view, people may seek private benefits under the 
"laws" laid down by representatives, and by seeking benefits on grounds that are 
only partially observable. 
The dynamic problem described by Hayek can be thought of as a 
time-inconsistency problem in the language of modern economics. Peoples', as well 
as representatives' inability to credibly commit to rules that would put 
benefit-seeking from the government out of reach, implies that the temptation to 
seek the available benefits cannot be resisted. An enforceable commitment “not to 
vote selfishly” cannot be made by representatives of different groups. The 
constitutional proposal would be a remedy for this lack of commitment if it 
succeeds in making groups reluctant to enter bargains for variuos favors. On the 
same grounds the proposal would discourage political representatives from entering 
bargains that are more self-serving when voters are less informed than the 
representatives. 
During recent years economic research has been conducted on the result 
of political negotiations under different institutional arrangements. One difference 
being emphasized is between parliamentary democracies and the American system 
with more far-reaching division of powers between the legislative and the executive 
branches of government. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) analyze theoretically 
how well the different systems represent citizens’ preferences with respect to 
collective goods and income distribution, and whether the systems differ in their 
degree of resource use benefiting only the politicians. One difference is that 
majority groups within parliamentary systems tend to be formed within reasonably 
homogeneous political parties, while majority groups are formed among more 
heterogeneous and varying groups within the US non-parliamentary system. The 
latter system results in a smaller public sector but also in an under-supply of 
collective goods. 
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Persson and Tabellini (1998) analyze 
factors determining the relative strength of different groups within legislatures, and 
how different decision rules affect the expenditures of the public sector. A number 
of groups are seeking to form a winning coalition. The negotiating powers and the 
ability of different groups to join a winning coalition depend on the tax payments of 
the groups, which can be used to provide mutual favors, and the degree of 
satisfaction with status quo. 
Another interesting aspect of the bargaining democracy is developed by 
Chari, Jones and Marimon (1998) who show that within a majority election system 
the majority in each election district tend to elect a representative with a strong 
inclination to favor the district when spending public resources. At the same time 
the representatives would be disinclined to favor other districts than their own. The 
majority across all districts will prefer the result that all districts elect 
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representatives with little inclination to spend public funds. However, the majority 
of representatives will form a coalition favoring a group of districts.7 
Persson et al (1996) show that the separation of powers among independently 
elected government bodies -- as between states and the Federal government, and 
between the executive and the legislatives branches in the USA - may contribute to 
information revelation in the "political market". Thereby, the outcome of the 
political process may become more "efficient" in Becker's sense described above. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the bargaining democracy and the constitutional 
proposal is applicable on both the American system and on parliamentary systems, 
and on majority systems as well as proportional systems. In all the systems, the 
empowerment of governments to act in the special interest makes it an inherent 
necessity of them to do so although the results of the political processes may vary 
across systems as the abovementioned economists show. 
 
 
 
6. Comparing Constitutional Proposals 
 
There exist a number of proposals for constitutional reform. Separation of powers 
was mentioned above as a tool to enhance the information availability in the 
political process. Voting rules, such as requirements for qualified majorities were 
recently suggested by the "Lindbeck Commission” (Lindbeck-kommissionen, 1996) 
for specific issues in the Swedish context. Such rules would most likely increase the 
degree to which government actions become rule-oriented rather than outcome 
oriented. They increase the costs of creating a sufficiently large group that is able to 
vole for mutual favors. Thus, they increase the transactions costs for the "bargaining 
democracy". Qualified majorities are most likely easier to gather for rules of 
conduct than for outcome-oriented actions, because the "veil of ignorance" operates 
more effectively for rules than for outcomes.  
A more far-reaching proposal for constitutional reform has been 
proposed by Hayek (1979). He outlines principles for a constitution designed both 
to make the outcome of the democratic process coincide with principles held by the 
majority and to minimize the degree of coercion in society. The proposal is very 
simple: Distinguish between legislation proper with respect to rules of conduct, and 
decisions on directives for government spending, administration, and regulation by 
separating the two functions into two distinct assemblies elected by entirely 
different procedures. The government bodies would be subject to general rules of 
conduct decided upon by the legislative assembly. The model constitution also 
contains a general declaration of rights, and an important definition of what should 
qualify as law - a general rule of just conduct. A constitutional court would have to 
be established to test the appropriateness of the legislature's decisions against such a 
definition. 
The legislative assembly would be responsible for the body of criminal 
and private law, the principles of taxation, general regulations for safety and health, 
rules to secure competitive markets, corporate law, and the like. The coercive 
powers of governments would be limited to the enforcement of these general rules 
and principles. 
The proposal's government assembly would decide on the use of 
material and human resources entrusted to the public sector. The size and the 
general purposes of expenditures would be limited only indirectly by the general 
rules of conduct set down by the legislative assembly and by people's willingness to 
pay taxes. The general principles of taxation decided upon in the legislative 
                                                 
7 Bennedsen and Feldman (2002) compare “equilibrium lobbying” in a party system with votes of confidence and a 
majority system with little party discipline. They show that lobbying of legislators will be more intensive in the latter 
system. The authors also note that lobbying can take different forms and occur within the party organizations or be 
directed at those implementing the majority decisions 
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assembly would make citizens aware of their share of payments for specific 
services. This would prevent the current practice of disguising tax burdens to 
"…make those who will, ultimately have to bear it (the burden) as little aware of it 
as possible" (Hayek, 1979, p 127).l 
A critical issue for the constitutional proposal is to prevent the 
legislative assembly from instituting laws favoring large groups or wealthy interests. 
Hayek presents a number of suggestions in this regard. Most important, however, is 
the definition of "law" and the role of the constitutional court in evaluating the 
constitutionality of legislation against this definition. Hayek's proposal is 
far-reaching and most likely outside the realm of feasible reforms within the 
foreseeable future. It is subject to Dixit's (1996, pp 146-68) criticism that "All such 
arguments [recommendations of better alternatives] should recognize the full set of 
constraints on policy-making" and that observers as judges of outcomes or systems 
should not even think in terms of "first best" ignoring transactions costs in political 
processes. 
Buchanan (1996) also considers the general applicability or lack of 
directedness of rules as a criterion for validity of majority decisions. He focuses on 
issues of welfare and taxation. Buchanan's general applicability criterion with 
respect to taxation is obtained by the principle that the majority cannot exempt its 
own members from liability. With respect to government expenditures for public 
goods or fiscal transfers the criterion is that the majority cannot restrict access or 
eligibility to its own members. Even these definitions of general applicability are 
not easily operationalized. Can a progressive tax system be considered general 
enough? The answer would depend on who is in the majority voting on such a 
scheme. If the majority group consists of people who have in common a relatively 
low income, then, it is obvious that this majority has voted to impose high tax rates 
on others. Then the tax rule does not have general applicability but directedness. On 
the other hand, if the majority voting for a progressive system consists of rich as 
well as poor, then the tax-system can be said to be general.  
Could age be a criterion for eligibility for transfers under the generality 
principle? Buchanan argues "yes" on the grounds that everyone becomes old sooner 
or later. The same could be said about transfers to sick or disabled. Thus, the main 
point in Buchanan's interpretation is that a general rule must apply on most 
everyone now or in the future with some reasonable probability.  
Constitutional constraints on the type of legislation that may be 
considered eligible have the disadvantage that the general perception about an 
acceptable degree of directedness may change over time and depend on the 
particular issue being debated. The difficulty of defining what is a rule and what is 
not makes such changes likely and constitutionally imposed restrictions on what can 
be decided on by a majority too rigid as Dixit (1996) noted. It is desirable, therefore, 
that any mechanism governing the relative importance of directed and non-directed 
legislation is flexible over time. 
The proposal presented in Section 3 should be seen in the light of the 
difficulty of designing constitutional definitions of “rules of just conduct” in 
Hayek’s proposal and “general applicability” in Buchanan’s proposal. The hierarchy 
of laws in conflict substitutes for the need for specific definitions of rules and 
general applicability. Ranking of legislation by certain criteria substitutes for 
definitions. Instead of constraining governments’ range of decisions the proposal is 
expected to create political dynamics favoring rule-oriented legislation. In the 
following this dynamic aspect of the proposal is illustrated further.  
Under current legislative procedures for dealing with conflicts among 
laws one principle is that the specific dominates the general. This principle seems to 
hold in civil law countries as well as in common law countries. The above proposal 
would reverse the hierarchy but only when generality of laws satisfy criteria for 
rules rather than just being a general statement with respect to social objectives.  
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            Table 1 illustrates how political decisions with greater rule content may 
appear relative to decisions with greater directedness. The table is taken from 
Buchanan (1993) except that Buchanan distinguishes between policy measures with 
more or less generality while the table uses the term directedness in order to avoid 
the possible confusion related to the term generality. The intention of the table is not 
to define what is a rule or what is not, but it ranks policy actions in terms of the 
degree to which they have characteristics of rules. For example, environmental 
policy actions that apply equally across all industries are certainly directed towards 
specific social objectives but less so than a policy action that differentiates 
environmental standards across industries. Thus, under the hierarchy proposal 
presented above general environmental standards would dominate attempts by the 
legislative to grant favors to a specific industry by lowering its standards. 
To illustrate the dynamic aspects of the proposal we consider first 
contract law. Assume that there is a law specifying that all verifiable, voluntarily 
entered contracts that are not entered under duress for any party must be enforced.8 
If at the same time company law specifies that companies should have only one 
class of voting shares, then this restriction on the contractual arrangements among 
shareholders in a firm violates the general rule for validity of contracts. The conflict 
between the laws could be resolved by making the restriction on the classes of 
voting shares enabling rather than mandatory. Enabling laws are by definition 
default options in case contracts between parties do not specify some aspects of 
implicit contractual relations. Another way to resolve the conflict would be to go 
back to the drawing board for the rule with respect to contracts’ validity. For 
example, an exception could be made for multiparty contracts under certain 
conditions.  
Would it not be possible to simply add the provision “unless otherwise 
specified” to the general rule for contractual validity? Thereby the rule would seem 
to become subordinated to the more directed company law even in the case when it 
is mandatory. Under the proposal above it would be constitutional to add such a 
provision but it also would reduce the degree to which the contract law satisfies 
rule-criteria, because it opens the way for highly directed legislation. Thus, another 
rule may render the provision invalid. The main point is that legislators would have 
to consider the possibility that now or in the future there may exist rules violating 
legislation directed at specific objectives and groups.  
As another illustration consider restrictions on the establishment of 
private schools or their ability to charge for services. Such restrictions exist in many 
countries. However, if there is a rule specifying the freedom of business 
establishment the restrictions would stand in conflict with this rule. Again, the rule 
could be made subordinated relative to more directed laws containing restrictions on 
business activity, if the provision "unless the legislature decides otherwise" is added 
to the rule for freedom of business establishment. Even if a majority would agree on 
the "unless otherwise specified"-clause, it could be overruled, if a majority would 
agree on the provision that business establishments must not, for example, endanger 
health, safety, and security. Since "unless otherwise specified" allows a great deal of 
arbitrariness and directedness in any dimension the rule specifying conditions for 
restrictions on establishment of business satisfies rule-criteria to a greater degree. 
With the passing of the latter more conditional rule for freedom of establishment of 
business, the law prohibiting private schools may again contradict the more rule-
oriented law on freedom of business establishment. Those wanting to prevent 
private schools would have to find another way. For example, a law on duty of 
schooling could specify that the duty is fulfilled only by attendance in specific 
schools. However, if a majority could instead agree that duty would be fulfilled if 
schools live up to quality criteria, then a government monopoly would not be 
upheld. 
                                                 
8 It is assumed that a slave contract by definition must have been entered under duress. 
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The rule-oriented hierarchy proposal does not directly diminish the 
power of legislatures to pass policy measures with great directedness with respect to 
specific objectives and interest groups. However, the political dynamics and the 
policy debate would have to change in a fundamental way because there would 
always be groups trying to find a majority for general rules contradicting directed 
measures for which a majority really does not want to pay. Furthermore, individual 
politicians could obtain “cover” for not trying to extract benefits for a group under a 
rule-oriented law. Certainly, the policy debate would have to be strongly oriented 
towards rules of conduct, as well as specific social objectives favored by interest 
groups. Such a debate could create an awareness about conflicts between attitudes 
towards rules and attitudes towards measures favoring groups in society. 
 
7. Final Reflections 
There is a widespread concern that political representatives and the political process 
are viewed with disrespect, cynicism, and contempt among the citizenry. Following 
the diagnosis of the "bargaining democracy" such views are not necessarily the 
result of the wrong individuals seeking political careers. Rather, the cynicism seems 
to be the inevitable result of the great amount of discretionary power given to 
politicians. Given this power the politician must "play the game", being ready to 
bargain for and hand out favors to survive on the political arena, because he or she 
will be asked to do this by the same people who criticize the process as corrupt on 
other occasions. 
The hierarchy-of-laws proposal presented here, stating that legislation 
and policy measures with stronger rule contents dominate measures more strongly 
directed towards specific objectives favored by identifiable groups, could be a 
simple way of forcing the policy debate to focus on rules and principles of conduct 
instead of favors to various groups. Over time, a momentum towards legislation and 
policy measures that truly and transparently have majority support could be created. 
The omnipotency of governments criticized by Hayek would not be formally 
reduced but a constitutional court would simply be assigned the task to determine 
which one of conflicting laws has the stronger characteristics of “rules of just 
conduct”. The constitutional change would also have to include a careful 
specification of criteria for rules versus “directedness” of policy measures. 
There are also possible advantages in terms of social stability of the 
bargaining democracy. If it results in most groups becoming reasonably satisfied 
with the outcome of the political process, the bargaining may contribute to the 
general acceptance of the democratic rule. The hierarchy proposal presented here 
has the advantage of not making the bargaining for favors impossible but it is 
limited to increasing the awareness of the distinction between bargaining for favors 
and debating rules of just conduct, and to creating political dynamics in favor of 
rulemaking of legislatures.  
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                           Table 1.  Examples of degrees of rule-orirntation 
 
 
Greater rule orientation 
(weaker directedness)* 
Less rule orientationt 
(stronger directedness) ** 
Law: 
 
 
-equality in treatment of all 
persons 
-special treatment for any 
group for any reason 
Taxation: 
 
 
.broad based taxes -exclusion of voters from tax 
rolls 
-uniform rates of tax  
-absence of exemption -shelters, exemption, 
exclusions, special 
-inclusion of all persons in a 
tax structure 
treatment of sources and 
uses of tax base 
 -differential rates of tax 
among persons, forms of 
organization, 
                professions, 
locations, products 
 or other classificatory bases 
Expenditures: 
 
 
-collective consumption 
goods with benefits 
coincident with whole 
territory of polity, 
-local public goods centrally 
defined 
  
-fiscal federalism or 
subsidiarity, financing by 
political authority 
 
coincident in inclusivity 
with 
 
program benefits 
 
 
-demogrants as transfer 
payments 
 
Regulation of industry: 
 
 
-environmental controls over 
whole economy 
-differential control, by 
territory, by industry, by 
product, etc. 
  
-uniform tariffs on all 
imports 
-differential tariff or quota 
protection product by 
product 
  
-uniform subsidy for all 
industry 
-differential subsidization by 
product, territory or other 
base 
  
 
*    Toward Generality in Buchanan (1993) 
**  Toward Particularity in Buchanan (1993) 
 
Source: Buchanan (1993) 
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